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FEATURE
ARTICLE
The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act:
Hey! Where Did the Strict Constructionists Go?
Judicial Add-Ons Are Ruining a Perfectly Good Statute
by Clinton A. Krislov
The Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act,'
was originally enacted as a relatively
simple act to achieve consumer redress
by eliminating the scienter and other
technical pleading and proof
requirements that make common law
fraud an almost totally useless vehicle
to redress consumer frauds in a mass
market society. However, recent
decisions by the Illinois appellate and
supreme courts have added pleading
and proof hurdles not contained in the
statute that yank the teeth out of the
statute and eviscerate its effectiveness
as a tool of consumer redress.
By adding pleading
requirements and other exceptions and
hurdles not contained in the statute,
the courts have frustrated legislative
intent, and absolutely violated the
fundamental concepts of separation of
powers. Strict construction of the laws
is necessary in order to effectuate the
intent of the legislature, whether in
support of or in opposition to recovery.
The court's hostility toward enforcing
the laws as they read on the books,
whether motivated by pro- or anti-
consumer rights policy tilt, undermines
respect for the courts in exercising their
Clinton A. Krislov is a senior partner
at the Chicago law firm of Krislov &
Associates, Ltd. He engages in
consumer law, class actions and
public interest matters and is aformer
candidate for the U.S. Senate and
Illinois Attorney General.
appropriate role in government to
interpret the laws, and reconcile them
within our constitutional framework.
A Consumer Fraud Act claim
needs only to allege and prove (1) a
statement that misrepresents or omits a
material fact; (2) defendant's intent that
the deceptive statement be relied on;
and (3) damages arising from the
misrepresentation or omission.2 Unlike
common law fraud, scienter is not
required and attorneys' fees are
available.
Because scienter is not required
in a Consumer Fraud Action, the
plaintiff is not required to show that
the defendant knew the statement was
false in making it. Thus, even
"innocent misrepresentations" are
actionable.3 This is of monumental
importance because plaintiffs usually
have no basis for alleging defendants'
knowledge at the time the statement is
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made, and proving state of mind is
ordinarily impossible as a practical
matter in most cases.
Moreover, the statute also
allows the award of attorneys' fees. In
addition to the substantive recovery,
the statute provides an incentive for
attorneys to bring these cases. It also
increases the potential that consumers
can actually be restored to the position
they would have been in if no fraud
had occurred. In contrast, in a common
law fraud claim, generally the result is
requiring the defendant to repay only
the amount received from the fraud,
meanwhile the consumer must bear the
attorneys' fees. Since the common law
claim carries with it the American Rule
that each side pays its own attorneys'
fees and costs, the defendant never
pays more than the amount he should
never have received in the first place,
while the consumer is not made whole.
I. The "First Bite Free" Doctrine
In relatively short order, recent
Illinois court decisions have added a
new hurdle to asserting Consumer
Fraud Act liability, creating a "First-
Bite-Free" license so that consumer
fraud liability arises only for deceptive
activities that occur after a court has
previously adjudicated and declared
them illegal.
For example, in Stern v. Norwest
Mortgage, Inc.,4 a borrower challenged
the bank's mortgage escrow waiver fee,
a 1/4-point fee imposed upon a
borrower's exercise of his statutory
election to either pay his real estate
1999
taxes into an escrow or post a savings
account, under the Mortgage Escrow
Account Act.5 The trial court dismissed
the complaint as failing to state a cause
of action for violation of either the
Mortgage Escrow Act or Consumer
Fraud Act. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the escrow
waiver fee was prohibited by the
Mortgage Escrow Account Act, but,
nonetheless, did not violate the
Consumer Fraud Act. In the court's
view, the defendant's actions were
illegal as a matter of law, but were not
unfair or deceptive:
[w]hile defendant has urged upon
us a position with which we do
not agree, wecannot say that such
a position is the result of any
'unfair deceptive acts or practices'
nor can the acts of the defendant
be characterized as 'fraud, false
pretense, false promise or
concealment of an immaterial
fact.6
The court distinguished this
case from the "culpable defendant" in
People v. Ex. Rel. Hartigan v. Stianos,7
where the defendant had adopted a
practice of charging customers sales tax
in excess of the amount authorized by
law. In Stern, Justice Greiman held that
the Consumer Fraud Act prohibits
deception, not error, and professed not
to "reject or mean to affect those cases
which have properly stated that an
innocent misrepresentation can be
actionable under the Consumer Fraud
Act."' Justice Greiman explained,
[wie do not believe that the
assertion of a lender's right to an
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escrow waiver fee is a per se
violation of the Consumer Fraud
Act. Although the Consumer
Fraud Act has loosened the
requirement of scienter and
released the claimant of the
burden of showing reliance, there
must be a claim seated in
deceptive acts rather than a
reasonable difference of opinions
as to the meaning of an Act of the
Illinois General Assembly
[citations omitted].
Seeming satisfied that its
declaration would prospectively
prevent any future frauds on these
fees, Justice Greiman went on to
explain that the Consumer Fraud Act
would protect against a future escrow
charge. "If the day after this opinion is
spread of record, defendant seeks to
impose such a fee upon a borrower, a
different result would be obtained."9
Aware, perhaps of what might be
perceived as a hole through which
most frauds could be driven, the court
hoped to limit the holding to the
particular case, and stated, "[b]y this,
we do not mean that every deceiver is
like every dog, entitled to one bite. We
mean only that these facts do not lend
to an action under the Consumer Fraud
Act." 10
But, if Justice Greiman had
hoped to simply fashion a defense for
instances of innocent
misinterpretations of unconstrued
actions, the concept has instead
become a wholesale exoneration of
first-impression frauds. While Stern
proceeded to the Illinois Supreme
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Court, the rest of the appellate courts
began recognizing the "first bite free"
as a defense of almost anything that
had not been previously adjudicated
by controlling authority. Unfortunately,
defendants now uniformly assert it,
and the courts have applied this as a
"no controlling authority" or "first
bite" defense against a Consumer
Fraud Act action challenging any
practice that has not previously been
held to be deceptive.
The Illinois Supreme Court
decided a similar issue in Lee v.
Nationwide Cassel, LP.'1 The supreme
court allowed an almost identical
exception for a loan company that had
been improperly enforcing motor
vehicle installment sales contracts
against co-signers who were
inappropriately signed as "buyers" on
the contracts and placed on the vehicle
titles. After holding that the practice
was illegal, Justice Heiple's opinion for
the court threw the lender a life raft.
Where the defendant asserted that his
misrepresentation was based upon a
mere erroneous interpretation of the
statute, the Consumer Fraud Act did
not apply. Specificaly, the court ruled
that,
[d]efendant's alleged
misrepresentation that plaintiffs
were primarily liable under
the contracts was based upon an
erroneous interpretation of Section
18 of the Motor Vehicle Retail
Installment Sales Act (815 ILCS
375/18 (West 1992)). The appellate
court in Magna Bank v. Comer, 274
Ill. App. 3d 788, 175 Ill. Dec. 612,
Volume 11, number 4
600 N.E.2d 855 (1992) arrived at
the same erroneous interpretation
when called upon to construe the
statue. Given this uncertainty
about the applicable law, the
pleadings here failed to
adequately allege that defendant
employed any deception, fraud, or
misrepresentation, or engaged in
the concealment, suppression, or
omission of material fact, since
plaintiff's immunity from liability
was an unsettled question of law.2
The issue arose again in
Weatherman v. Gary Wheaton Bank of Fox
Valley.13 In Weatherman, the mortgage
borrowers complained of two charges
imposed on borrowers: (1) the
unagreed cost of recording the lender's
assignment of the mortgage; and (2) a
charge for an escrow suspension fee
(one quarter of a point to "suspend"
requiring security). The trial and
appellate courts in Weatherman both
found that the escrow suspension fee
was legal, but held that the practice of
imposing an unagreed charge for
recording the lender's assignment of its
loan was not permitted. And, once
again, the court held that it was the
result of a "legitimate disagreement" as
to an unsettled issue and freed the
defendant of Consumer Fraud Act
liability. "Assuming GaryWheaton was
incorrect in its interpretation of the
Escrow act, as the lender was in Stern,
this would not prove a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act." 14
Nonetheless, the appellate court
did find the recording charge to be a
violation of the Consumer Fraud Act
and distinguished it from Stern. The
court stated,
[iln [Stern] the lender informed
the borrower of the fee and the
borrower elected among his
options. Here, by contrast, there
was a concealment of a fact,
GaryWheaton's course of conduct
amply demonstrates that it
designed to delay disclosure until
borrowers were virtually
powerless to take any action: [at
the] dosing. If this were, as in
Stern, an honest dispute on
statutory construction, then, as in
Stern, it would be disclosed early,
rather than late.5
The Illinois Supreme Court granted
leave to appeal, and held for the Bank
on both counts. 6 The court held that
the Bank was entitled to charge for
waiving the escrow, and that the
recording fee had been disclosed
sufficiently to meet RESPA by a non-
itemized listing of the total dollar
amount of charges that would be
imposed in connection with the
transaction17 even though the recording
charge was for a transaction, the
lender's assignment of the mortgage,
that was not part of the borrower's
transaction. 8
In another case, Cahnman v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, 9 the plaintiff
challenged the car rental company's
collection of an "additional driver"
charge for people who were already
additional drivers by statute.20
Although the court initially found for
the defendant without argument, the
case was reconsidered and argued on
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the grounds that the charge was not
proscribed by the Vehicle Code. The
court asserted, in dicta, that the result
would not change even if it were to
hold that the Vehicle Code does
prohibit the additional charge. The
court stated, "our result would not
change because until now the question
was at best unsettled, [citing Stern and
Weatherman]."21 The court went on to
explain,
[e]ven assuming arguendo that we
were now to hold that section 6-
305 does prohibit defendant's
conduct, we would nevertheless
conclude that there is no violation
of the Consumer Fraud Act
because until now the question
was at best unsettled. [citing Lee,
Stern, and Weatherman].?
The court essentially adopted a
pure first-bite-free rule and elevated
the provision to an ambiguous
provision of first impression. Thus, this
immunity from liability for an innocent
"erroneous interpretation"of an
"unsettled question of law" formed the
backdrop for the supreme court's
affirmance of Stern.
At its base, first-bite-free
inappropriately restores a scienter
requirement by the back door
(requiring essentially proof of notice of
a prior adjudication of deception). The
whole reason this act was passed in the
first place is the practical inability to
even allege, let alone prove, that a
seller intended to deceive. Thus, all the
Consumer Fraud Act requires is a
statement that is false, unfair or
deceptive, coupled with a seller's
intent that the buyer rely on the
statement. That is why the cases hold
that even innocent misrepresentations
are actionable under the Consumer
Fraud Act.
In expanding Lee, Stern and
Weatherman to a first-bite-free approach
on any previously unconstrued fraud,
the court has chosen a path that
eviscerates the Consumer Fraud Act,
and renders it a pure duplicate form of
common law fraud, complete with its
requirement to prove intent to defraud.
The Consumer Fraud Act focuses on
seller's deceptive acts, rather than the
seller's notice, motive or intent. It
reflects the legislature's recognized
conscious decision to craft a cause of
action intended to be broadly and
liberally construed for the purpose of
eradicating consumer fraud and
deterring fraud. And that is why, in
contrast to common law fraud, the act
does not require notice nor a seller's
intent to deceive in order to find an
actionable violation 3 The Consumer
Fraud Act does not require that the
party making the untrue statement has
actual knowledge or belief that the
statement is untrue and a plaintiff may
recover for innocent misrepresentation.24
Instead, the legislature's "love-the-
sinner, hate-the-sin" focuses
intentionally on the effect the seller's
actions have on the consumer, not on
whether the seller already had
constructive notice that his actions
were deceptive.25 The fact that an
action is deceptive is enough. The act
does not require allegation or proof
that the defendant knew the statement
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was untrue or deceptive at the time it
was made. The defendant need only
give the consumer the statement or
omission and intend the consumer to
act on that statement. By focusing on
whether the defendant knew or had
notice of the untruth, the court has
produced new requirements not
present in the law.
Likewise, the first-bite-free
concept imposes an insurmountable
burden on the plaintiff. Without
information produced from discovery,
the plaintiff generally cannot know the
defendant's state of mind. But, even if
the defendant had such bad,
purposeful knowledge, the plaintiff
cannot just allege such scienter, and
cannot survive a motion to dismiss
necessary to enable discovery to
determine the defendant's state of
mind.
II. Other Noxious Judicial Add-
Ons and Subtractions
Although "first bite free" ought
to be relegated to the pound and put
down, the legislature has itself created
at least one dearly unconstitutional
change.26 Likewise, a host of other
burgeoning exceptions to a literal
reading of the Consumer Fraud Act are
no less noxious viruses that threaten
the dear straightforward application
and enforcement of the Act. These
could be innoculated by merely
applying the act as it is written.
A. The "Voluntary Payment"
Concept
One such exception or hurdle
concept that has been contorted into a
Consumer Fraud Act defense is the so-
called "voluntary payment" rule. The
voluntary payment rule is actually a
concept of state taxation. A party that
has voluntarily paid a tax or other
government exaction, like city parking
tickets, without "paying under protest"
or otherwise reserving his rights under
the statute cannot later challenge the
exaction even if it is illegal for some
reason.27 This concept springs from the
concern that a government entity's
finances may be thrown into disarray if
an after-the-fact finding of technical
illegality can trigger severe repayment
liability for publicly enacted levies. In
contrast, commercial operators who
engage in deceptive practices do not
have similar public entity equities. As
"morphed" into a Consumer Fraud Act
defense, it holds that a consumer who
pays a disputed charge of which he has
notice may not thereafter sue to
recover the charge.28
The voluntary payment cases
under the consumer fraud rubric are
better re-categorized as merely lacking
in deception. To wit, a seller's
imposition of a fee that has been fully
disdosed is not deceptive. It may be
unfair and actionable anyway,29 and it
ought not to require that the consumer
risk losing the rest of his goods or
services in order to challenge the
charge. But a deceptive charge should
still be actionable and recoverable even
if it was buried but technically
disclosed in the statement, when the
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consumer discovers the deception after
having paid it. Affording commercial
swindlers the same deference afforded
to governmental entities unfairly
elevates the former and diminishes the
latter.
B. Consumer Nexus
Another judge-made hurdle is
the so-called consumer nexus
requirement. Under this concept, the
court, having found a practice to be
otherwise actionable, may nonetheless
release the defendant from liability if
the act or practice does not implicate
"consumer protection concerns." 3° In
Brody v. Finch University of Health
Sciences, students were lured into
enrolling in a graduate physiognomy
program whose satisfactory
completion would lead to admission to
the full medical school program. These
students were subsequently denied
admission to medical school. The court
found actionable deception and breach
of contract, but held that claims under
the Consumer Fraud Act must satisfy
the "consumer nexus test." The court
described this nexus:
[w]here a plaintiff attempts to
allege a violation of the
[Consumer Fraud] Act in a case
which appears on its face to
involve only a breach of contract,
the relevant inquiry is 'whether
the alleged conduct [involves
trade practices addressed to the
market generally or otherwise]
implicates consumer protection
concerns.'
31
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Happily, Brody ruled that the test was
met for the unfortunate students.
However, the concept is ill-applied to
cases in which individual consumers
are the plaintiffs, and adds a
redundancy that doesn't exist in the
statute.
The consumer nexus test is
justifiable only where the case is
brought by one business against
another, for it is only where the
"consumer" is a commercial enterprise
that the Act's purpose of affording
relief to consumers needs to be
established. And indeed, that is
precisely the point of applying or not
applying the act in commercial plaintiff
cases.32 Adding the consumer nexus as
an additional hurdle to natural,
individual consumers' recoveries
seems at best a redundancy. After all,
the plaintiff already has to be a
consumer under the statute. If the
consumer nexus hurdle adds anything
more, it lies outside the requirements
of the statute. At worst, it is the
resurrection of the requirement to also
show a "public injury, a pattern or an
effect" that this shortlived judicial
engraftment was intended to be
eradicated by the 1990 amendments to
the Consumer Fraud Act, "darify[ing]
the legistative intent that a plaintiff
suing under the Consumer Fraud Act
could state a claim based upon a single,
isolated injury and based solely upon
the plaintiff's own injury." '
C. Implication of Consumer
Protection Concerns
Volume 11, number 4
Another hurdle created by the
court is the requirement that the
plaintiff must plead an implication of
consumer protection concerns in his
complaint. Despite the finding that the
students had met the consumer nexus
requirement, the Brody court
nonetheless held that plaintiffs'
complaint was lacking because they
failed to plead an implication of
consumer protection concerns. The
court explained,
plaintiffs must plead and
otherwise prove (1) that their
actions were akin to a consumer's
actions to establish a link between
them and consumers; (2) how
defendant's representations
regarding their cases of being
accepted into defendant's medical
school concerned consumers other
than themselves; (3) how
defendant's particular breach of
denying them admission into
defendant's medical school
involved consumer protection
concerns; and (4) how the
requested relief would serve the
interests of consumers. After
hearing all of the testimony and
reviewing the evidence, the trial
court ruled that plaintiffs failed to
prove that a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act occurred.
Plaintiffs evidently failed to allege
and prove the necessary nexus
between defendant's complained-
of conduct and consumer
protection concerns. After
reviewing the record, we find that
the trial court's decision was not
against the manifest weight of the
evidence.34
This is at best, meaningless
redundence. A consumer who
otherwise meets the Consumer Fraud
Act pleading requirements has ready
pleaded "consumer protetion
concerns," his own. Like the consumer
nexus requirement, this also deserves
to be dispatched.
D. Exemption of Attorneys from
Consumer Fraud Act Liability
In Cripe v Leiter,3s the court
created yet another exception to the
Consumer Fraud Act by carving
attorneys out of Consumer Fraud Act
liability. In Cripe, an action against an
attorney who had overbilled a client
for allegedly overpriced and
underperformed work, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that lawyers are
not subject to Consumer Fraud Act
liability at all.36 Justice Bilandic's
opinion for six members of the court
held that the attorney-client
relationship in Illinois, "unlike the
merchant-consumer relationship, is
already subject to extensive regulation
by this court."37 The court went on to
assert that,
[t]he legislature did not, in the
language of the Consumer Fraud
Act, specify that it intended the
Act's provisions to apply to the
conduct of attorneys in relation to
their clients. Given this court's
role in that arena, we find that had
the legislature intended the Act to
apply in this manner, it would
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have stated that intention with
specificity. Absent a clear
indication by the legislature, we
will not conclude that the
legislature intended to regulate
attorney-client relationships
through the Consumer Fraud Act
[citations omitted]. 31
Judicially carving out new
exceptions for professional categories
not exempted by the legislature is bad
new track to lay. It invites either a
division of lawyers who control the
system for themselves, or demands for
similar exceptions for every other
calling that has its own internal
disciplinary provisions.
III. Fundamental Problems With
Judicial Add-ons and Exceptions
Judicial creation of new
exceptions and pleading requirements
is wrong and for a host of reasons
judical add-ons and exceptions
frustrate the legislative intent and
violate separation of powers. These
particular embellishments do real
harm. They also act as an incentive to
sellers to exploit questionable practices
not yet adjudicated by the courts, and
they seriously impede consumers'
efforts to obtain any meaningful
redress for Consumer Fraud Act
harms.
A. No Basis for Conclusion of
Innocence
One problem with the "First Bite
Free Doctrine," in all these cases, is that
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it lacks any evidentiary basis at all. The
trial court in all these cases simply
takes the defendant's answer, denying
the allegations and arguing the
innocent mistake orally, and dismisses
the count without any factual
presentation of evidence. The decision,
thus, rests solely on the pleadings. The
complaint alleges deception and the
motion to dismiss professes innocence.
Justice Harrison's dissent in
Stern castigated the court's treatment of
the defendant's actions as a
conclusively honest mistake, which
was established at the pleadings stage
and in contradiction to the way the
complaint characterized the
defendant's action. The dissent argued,
[i]n the matter before us, there is
no dispute that escrow
requirements were an important
part of plaintiffs' mortgage
transactions with Norwest
Mortgage Company and were
therefore material. Plaintiffs
dearly allege that the company
misrepresented or concealed,
suppressed, or omitted those
requirements by failing to give
notice, as required by law, that
they could avoid escrow without
payment of a fee and by
supplying plaintiffs with
information about escrow
accounts that was inconsistent
with the law. The company
obviously intended consumers
such as plaintiffs to rely on its
misrepresentations, suppressions,
and omissions, and the consumers
did so rely. According to the
Volume 11, number 4
complaint consumers paid the fee
the company demanded even
though the fee was illegal and the
company had no right to collect
it.39
As Justice Harrison points out,
there simply was no basis for
conclusively finding that the mistake
was innocent or not without discovery
of the defendant. The defendant's
knowledge, state of mind, and intent
simply cannot be determined factually
from the plaintiff's complaint.
Consequently, the funding of innocent
scienter is puzzling.
B. Frustration of Legislative Intent
Additionally, the courts'
unwillingness to apply the law as
written is just the kind of judicial
lawmaking that frustrates the
legislature's intent to craft a simple,
effective tool to root out customer
frauds of all types and forms. Self-
proclaimed strict constructionists who
frustrate the rule of law by erecting
obstacles not contained in the statute
are engaging in just the same sort of
judicial lawmaking for which they
routinely complain about judges who
go beyond the law to achieve relief.
If the legislature had intended to
preclude or differentiate consumer
fraud actions arising on first
impression fact or issues, it could have
explicitly said so in the statute itself-'
Indeed, the entire body of Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act decisions,
consisting almost exclusively of first
impression adjudications of newly
1999
uncovered deceptive practices, would
have been reversed.41
C. Impact on Actions in the
Marketplace
1. Encouragement to Novel
Schemes
Immunizing the first bite
reverses the Act's intended incentives.
A general act that enables recoveries
against any practices found to be
deceptive poses a threat to commercial
operators against crossing the
proverbial "line" and encourages
honest dealing. In contrast, first-bite-
free encourages sellers to exploit every
questionable practice not already
adjudicated by the courts. They can
take the attitude of "try everything,
because liability will only result after
the first decision is reported." All
scams until then will produce profit
that may be kept. This attitude actually
encourages the creation of new
consumer frauds. Since the first form of
wrongdoing is given a pass on liability,
it encourages defendants to push the
envelope on every issue where there
has been no definitive ruling already.
Faced with a choice between imposing
any charge, the defendant must choose
to impose the charge. If he refrains
from imposing the charge, he loses the
revenue. If he goes ahead and imposes
the charge, he gets the additional
revenue, may not have to refund it at
all, and has no risk of bearing the
additional cost of attorney's fees unless
and until imposing the charge after
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someone in the first place.
2. Elimination of Incentives
to Challenge Fraud
Additionally, holding that the
first ruling on each deceptive practice
is not actionable under consumer fraud
affirmatively eliminates all incentive
for consumer champions to bring
actions. Since it is only under the
Consumer Fraud Act that the
attorney's fees' incentive is available,
the first attorney to challenge a
deceptive practice, and establish the
legal decision of its deceptiveness, is
the only one who will not be rewarded
to bringing the action.
Thereafter, the only litigation
that could be brought under the
Consumer Fraud Act would be against
other defendants who were so stupid
as to proceed ahead after the decision
and only for charges imposed after the
decision. Thus, all deceiving
mercantilists are freed of liability for all
frauds done before the decision in the
first case becomes final.
D. Violation of Separation of
Powers
On another level, the courts'
creation of new exceptions and
declaration of only prospective
invalidity fundamentally violates the
basic concepts of separation of powers.
By enacting a substantive prohibition
beginning on the date of decision, the
judiciary violates the separation of
powers between the three branches of
government. 2 The function of the
judiciary is to interpret the law as it
exists, not enact new provisions; it may
not decide to carve out exceptions not
enacted by the legislature. For
example, in People v. Garner,4 the
prosecution argued that the law
entitling a criminal defendant to an
admonishment that his failure to
appear waives his right to confront
witnesses against him should not
apply to "experienced criminals" who
already know the rule and manipulate
it to their advantage with a pattern of
bail jumping. In refusing to create the
exception for "experienced criminals,"
the Illinois Supreme Court stated,
[i]t is not the function of this court
to determine what might be a
better rule. The legislature is
vested with the power to enact
laws. Under the doctrine of
separation of powers, courts may
not legislate, rewrite or extend
legislation. If the statute as
enacted seems to operate in
certain cases unjustly or
inappropriately, the appeal must
be to the General Assembly, and
not to the court. [citation omitted].
Our function is to interpret and
apply the law as it is announced
by the legislature. In interpreting
the law, it is our duty to give effect
to the intent of the legislature. We
are powerless to annex to a statute
a provision or condition
which the General Assembly did
not see fit to impose [citation
omitted] .4
The legislature has already
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decided that it is a violation to commit
a deceptive business practice and
carved no exception for un-interpreted
laws or defendants acting in good
faith.' Once the court has determined
that a deceptive business practice has
occurred, it is the court's job to enforce
it. By handling the statutes as new
edicts of law upon each declaration by
the courts, the court improperly usurps
the legislature's authority under the
Constitution. The courts' "first bite
free" interpretation of the Consumer
Fraud Act does just that.
The courts' declaration of only
prospective invalidity violates another
important related concept of separation
of powers, i.e., that the courts interpret
what the law is; they do not enact new
law so civil decisions are strongly
presumed to apply retrospectively, not
just prospectively from the date of
decision.46 The applicable test is
contained in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson.47 As laid out in Chevron, and
quoted by Justice Freeman in Aleckson,
a decision should not be limited to
prospective application unless justified
under all three of the following:
i) the decision "established a new
principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent
on which litigants may have
relied... or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution
was not dearly foreshadowed."
ii) whether, given the purpose and
prior history of the new rule, its
operation will be retarded or
promoted by prospective
application, and
iii) whether prospective
application is mandated by the
balance of equities.48
It is inconceivable that any of
the first bite cases to date could meet
that standard, but none of the courts
have applied that analysis.
Nonetheless, as applied to these cases,
prospective-only application is
antithetical to consumer protection and
grossly unfair except only for those
situations in which the defendant can
show a published decision on which he
reasonably relied. Prospectiveonly
application does nothing to further the
purpose of the consumer protection
laws and the equities dearly favor the
ignorant consumer over the aggressive
business person's quest for greater profit.
IV. Conclusion
Strict construction of the laws
stands as perhaps the only substantial
protection of consumer rights in a time
when the legislatures and courts seem
inclined to whittle away at limiting
consumer redress. At a time when the
legislatures are under extreme pressure
to cut back on liability statutes, rather
than expand them, it is appropriate for
the courts to recognize that strict
construction of the consumer recovery
statutes as written is perhaps the
strongest protection against judicial
vicisitudes that threaten to cut them
back. When those who oppose
expanding consumer rights argue that
we should just enforce the current laws
on the books, perhaps we should do
just that.
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Endnotes
1 See 815 ILCS 505/2. The Consumer Fraud
Act states,
[u]nfair methods of competitions and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
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